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Abstract— Mobile Computing Devices (MCDs) such as 
Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), smart phones, handheld 
personal computers, and Tablet PCs, are proliferating in the 
marketplace. As MCDs become more powerful and 
commonplace with ubiquitous connectivity, the line that 
currently divides these handheld devices from typical network 
computers will become very unclear. Bluetooth, WiFi, and 
cellular technologies interconnect mobile devices with other 
computing devices and represent vectors into the device that 
may be exploited by malicious persons. A malicious person 
can theoretically take complete control of a mobile device via 
wireless and use it for all kinds of illicit purposes. While some 
malicious codes have been reported in the literature for these 
devices, it is only a matter of time before these codes become 
as common on mobile devices as they are on desktop 
computers. Most people have had an experience with a virus 
on their desktop PC, but have not had the same experience on 
their smart phone.  This will change. The INL is conducting 
research into MCD vulnerabilities and countermeasures and 
has developed a web-based client server application for 
tracking this data. These efforts are described in this paper. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices have become integrated into the business 
processes of both government and commercial institutions. 
Cheap and ubiquitous mobile computing devices represent 
computing’s fifth wave [1], bringing about new opportunities 
in the marketplace. MCDs are small, portable, and able to 
store large amounts of information. The breadth of 
communication options (infrared, radio frequency, or USB 
cable) for MCDs introduces many security risks. Some of the 
problems associated with MCDs are: easy to loose, misplace, 
or have stolen; potential loss/comprise of company data (user 
ids, passwords, contacts, digital certificates, sensitive 
documentation, credit card numbers), increases the 
opportunity for a backdoor into an enterprise’s network, lack 
of authentication and limited logging capability. The use of 
these devices poses a risk to the security of an organization. 
Identifying wireless devices in a given air space is necessary 
to discover misconfigured devices or security holes or back 
doors into the corporate network. 
Mobile phones are at the greatest risk due to their shear 
numbers in the marketplace [2] and the convergence of PDA 
like functionality and cellular technology into a single smart 
phone device [3]. There are currently more than 2.5 billion 
cellular connections worldwide [4]. The mobile malware 
count has already exceeded 200 so far this year [5].
Patching personal computer (PC) software to mitigate 
security vulnerabilities or upgrade applications is almost 
automatic today. However, patching mobile device 
firmware/software is a more difficult process, typically 
requiring connectivity with a PC. The likelihood that mobile 
device owners, who are mostly not security conscious, will 
perform these upgrades is highly improbable, increasing the 
possibility of spreading malware.  
Information technology departments are allowing 
employees to procure mobile devices due to their low cost and 
ability to improve productivity. As such, a company or 
government entity has little control over corporate data 
leaving the organization on a mobile device. How the devices 
are used and the type of information that is stored on the 
devices will directly impact the overall risk to the 
organization. Organizations should perform risk assessments 
and develop security plans for MCDs to understand the value 
of data stored on these devices and the risk of compromising 
enterprise networks. MCD vulnerability tracking and research 
is essential to minimizing this risk. 
II. THREATS TO A MOBILE DEVICE
Threat modeling techniques are used to identify and 
prioritize the threats posed to a MCD. At a high level this 
process involves identifying the entry points into a device, 
assets on the device, how the device is used, modeling the 
system, identifying the threats, and determining if there are 
valid attack paths for the threats [6]. Some examples of 
potential threats, and corresponding assets, for smart phones 
are shown in Table 1. 
TABLE 1. POTENTIAL MOBILE DEVICE THREATS AND ASSETS 
Threat Asset 
1. Unauthorized local/long distance 
phone call 
Access to cellular network 
2. Code execution Ability to execute arbitrary code 
using a well-known process 
3. Unauthorized remote access Mobile device configuration 
4. Unauthorized access to local 
network (LAN) 
Data/processes on the LAN 
5. Spying on a conversation Telephone conversation 
6. Deletion of meeting notices Calendar 
7. Copying business/personal data Database 
8. Deletion of contact list Contact list 
9. Make cellular device useless Mobile device battery 
Threat 1. An adversary that can place malicious code on the 
mobile device can potentially make long-distance phone calls 
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2and disable the ringer. A user may not realize the 
unauthorized use of the phone until the monthly billing cycle. 
Threat 2. An adversary may be able to replace an existing 
well-known application with their own special version that 
enables them to execute code at will. 
Threat 3, 4. An adversary who gains access to the device may 
modify the Bluetooth/WiFi configuration to require no 
authentication.
Threat 5. Special software placed on the device may allow 
others to listen in on conversations. 
Threat 6. Unauthorized remote access would allow an 
adversary to read or modify entries in the calendar. 
Threat 7. Databases do exist for mobile devices. 
Unauthorized access may enable an adversary to copy 
personal/business data. 
Threat 8. Smart phones and PDAs contain contact lists. A 
contact list records email address, phone numbers, business 
address, and general notes on each contact. This information 
may be deleted or modified if an adversary has access to the 
device. 
Threat 9. The battery is the lifeblood of a mobile device. 
Without power the cellular device is useless. An adversary 
may construct an attack that sends junk data to a smart phone, 
keeping the device continuously alive and draining the 
battery. 
Some other possible threats include make long distance 
phone calls, gain access to contact information or meeting 
notes, connect to corporate systems (via Bluetooth, WiFi, or 
cradle)  and exporting data, and sending email or SMS (Short 
Message Service) messages unbeknownst to the user. Threats 
that have valid attack paths are considered vulnerabilities; i.e., 
the vulnerability is a way of realizing the threat. 
Software development kits (SDKs), with source code, are 
now available for MCDs. The source code provides the 
software developer with the ability to create distinctive 
devices, while also opening the door for malicious 
programmers to introduce additional threats.  
III. MOBILE DEVICE VULNERABILITIES
The INL has categorized known vulnerabilities and attacks 
according to the type of network components and software 
elements that are susceptible. This provides a proof of 
principle on how an adversary might be able to exploit 
identified weaknesses in specific software elements in order to 
perform undesirable activities. Insecure or rogue wireless 
devices can compromise the infrastructure of an organization. 
Understanding the vulnerabilities, and the associated 
countermeasures, of MCDs is the key to mitigating the threat.  
The main objective of this effort is to enhance the security of 
MCDs and make them safer to use in corporate and 
government environments. Meeting this objective requires 
understanding the threats, and then providing guidance on 
how to mitigate those threats. This objective is met by 
performing vulnerability research and tracking mobile device 
vulnerabilities. Mobile device research requires an 
understanding of the continually evolving technologies 
deployed on MCDs. 
A number of computer vulnerability databases are currently 
accessible over the Internet today. However there is no known 
equivalent to this in the mobile device world. The INL has 
developed a Web-based intelligent database application, 
MDVD (Mobile Device Vulnerability Database), that stores 
vulnerability and countermeasure information for MCDs. 
MDVD enables a user to query for technical information on a 
MCD, which accesses a vulnerability and countermeasure 
database, and produces a report detailing the known 
vulnerabilities and countermeasures. Vulnerability and 
countermeasure information is harvested from the Internet and 
then entered into MDVD. A variation of MDVD, based on a 
collaborative database model, will be hosted on the Internet in 
the near future. This will allow registered users to enter 
vulnerability and countermeasure data that will reviewed by 
moderators before being made available to all users.   
The approach to understanding the security issues 
associated with mobile devices involves: 
1. Vulnerability discovery, 
2. Vulnerability testing, 
3. Using tools to protect MCDs from vulnerabilities, 
and
4. Understand threats posed by the wireless landscape. 
A. Vulnerability Discovery 
Viruses and other exploits are possible to develop for 
computing devices due to flaws, or vulnerabilities, in the 
software. Vulnerability verification requires the execution of 
exploits to establish the truth, accuracy, or efficacy of 
vulnerabilities on specific devices.  Vulnerabilities for MCDs 
are found by:  
x Searching the Internet for documented vulnerabilities 
and
x By first hand discovery using traditional vulnerability 
discovery techniques applied to mobile devices.  
Searching the Internet for Documented Vulnerabilities.
Information on computer and mobile device vulnerabilities 
come from several different sources on the Internet, but not 
limited to the following: 
x Vulnerability databases, 
x Alert services, 
x Vulnerability tracking services,  
x Advisory services, and  
x General Web (blogs, Yahoo Answers, Google 
Answers, newsgroups, other) 
Information is currently being manually gathered while 
exploring semi-automated information extraction techniques. 
Vulnerability information may be found on the Web in 
3generally an unstructured format. For example, “BlackBerry 
flaw highlights growing mobile device risks” is a news story 
that discusses an exploit that allows access to an enterprise 
network via the Blackberry 
(http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/originalContent/0,28914
2,sid14_gci1211099,00.html). Vulnerability information is 
sometimes found in a semi-structured format where 
vulnerability title, reference, and ID are identified in an 
HTML table, such as 
http://www.qualys.com/research/rnd/top10/.
There are no known databases dedicated strictly to MCD 
vulnerabilities. There are databases that contain information 
on features and capabilities of wireless and mobile devices 
(http://wurfl.sourceforge.net/) and a collection of data on the 
devices supported by each carrier in XML format 
(http://mobile.kaywa.com/). Some examples of vulnerability 
databases, which may include vulnerabilities for MCDs, are: 
x OSVDB - http://www.osvdb.org/
x NVD - http://nvd.nist.gov/
x SFVD- http://www.securityfocus.com/vulnerabilities
x CERT – http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/
x CERIAS - https://cirdb.cerias.purdue.edu/coopvdb
x Help Net Security - http://www.net-security.org
x LWN.net - http://lwn.net/Vulnerabilities/
x WVE - http://www.wirelessve.org/
x NISCC - http://www.niscc.gov.uk/
First Hand Discovery of MCD Vulnerabilities. Traditional 
vulnerability discovery techniques are applied to MCDs to 
find vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities and countermeasures 
are part of the MDVD database. These vulnerability discovery 
techniques include source code review, protocol fuzzing [7], 
encryption analysis, and file version comparison. A detailed 
study of Bluetooth and WiFi protocol stacks on Linux, where 
source code is available, may generate ideas on possible attack 
vectors into a mobile device [8, 9, and 10] as well. 
B. Vulnerability Testing 
The development of exploit code is one of the most difficult 
programming tasks when verifying computer vulnerabilities. 
The software may present a common programming error (e.g. 
buffer overflow), but writing an exploit that exercises that 
particular portion of the vulnerable software is often tricky.  
Not all programming errors are easily exploitable. Another 
challenge in writing exploit code is the hurdle of becoming 
familiar with unique mobile device architectures.  Exploit 
code is often written in assembly instructions.  The instruction 
set for a device depends upon the processor and available C 
libraries depend upon the operating system.   
A vector analysis is performed using the previously 
discovered vulnerabilities in MDVD. The vector analysis 
produces attack vectors that represent the sequence of 
software steps that must be created to develop the exploits. 
The exploits are then run to verify the vulnerabilities in 
MDVD; i.e., make sure the vulnerabilities really represent 
weaknesses in the software that attackers could exploit. 
C. Using Tools to Protect Mobile Devices from 
Vulnerabilities 
Protecting business organizations from MCDs with known 
vulnerabilities requires the ability to detect those devices and 
automatically identify vulnerabilities. Mobile computing 
devices continue to gain more capability, in terms of CPU 
power, data storage, battery life, and high-speed wireless 
communications. Many applications that run on desktop 
computers will be migrated to these devices as the capabilities 
increase. Commercial virus protection, firewalls, and intrusion 
detection systems provide a first line of defense. Data 
encryption, password protection, and sensible configuration 
management will also provide protection against mobile 
malware. 
An INL toolkit is under development that identifies device 
vulnerabilities and provides an organization with 
countermeasure information that can be applied to mitigate 
those vulnerabilities. The toolkit additionally provides 
defensive software that may be deployed on a mobile device 
to mitigate the possibility of rogue code using the 
communications capability of the device to export 
information. The vulnerability is that communications 
channels may be subject to unauthorized use on a mobile 
device. 
General Specific 
Wireless Communication Technology Bluetooth, WiFi, Cellular, Infrared 
Operating System Linux, Windows, Palm, Symbian 
Communication Protocol HTTP, FTP, Telnet, SSH, TCP/IP 
Application Email, Browser, Office Software, 
Database, Games, Others 
Software Code VBScript, JavaScript, Applets, 
Active X Controls, batch files, shell 
scripts, macros, executables, Flash 
Mobile devices, like desktop computers, employ a variety 
of software technologies (see Table 2). Any of these 
technologies may provide potential attack vectors/entry points 
into a mobile device.  For example, vulnerabilities in 
802.11b/g, or an unsafe configuration, could enable a 
malicious user to gain unrestricted access to the device. 
Mobile device operating system (OS), communication 
protocol, application, or general software code that uses 
insecure functions and simply trusts input data makes the 
software vulnerable to buffer overruns, indexing errors, 
format string bugs, and Unicode/ANSI buffer size mismatches 
[11]. However, unlike desktop/laptop/server computers, 
mobile devices have one owner who is the “administrator” 
and “user” of the device. Additionally, access control lists, 
which are an important defensive mechanism for general 
computers, are non-existent on mobile devices.  
TABLE 1. POSSIBLE ENTRY POINTS INTO A MCD 
4D. Understanding Threats Posed By Wireless Landscape 
Understanding the potential methods of attack is important 
for implementing effective defensive strategies. Mobile 
devices use wireless communication technologies to connect 
to other devices and networks. The likelihood of malicious 
code being deployed on mobile devices will increase as 
mobile high-speed data networks become pervasive. A key 
element in safely using MCDs is to understand the threats 
posed by the wireless landscape, which consists of wireless 
transceivers used both in businesses and homes. MCDs move 
between work, home, and elsewhere, potentially making these 
devices susceptible to malicious code. Misconfigured devices, 
security holes, and back doors may be identified by collecting 
and analyzing data from the wireless landscape.  
Wireless transceivers may be cell towers, Bluetooth 
devices/access points, and WiFi devices/access points.  
Bluetooth technology is deployed in audio headsets, vehicles, 
mobile devices, printers, vending machines, parking meters, 
and others. WiFi technology is deployed as local area 
networks and in many laptop computers and mobile devices. 
As noted in Table 2, wireless devices and technologies 
represent potential vectors into mobile devices. To get an 
understanding of the wireless landscape, both Bluetooth and 
WiFi data were gathered in the same geographical area.  
The collected Bluetooth data consists of Bluetooth device 
address, manufacturer, device type, signal strength, pairing 
and connection status, time, and services available. The 
Bluetooth services available may include voice gateway, dial-
up networking, serial port, and file transfer. The Bluetooth 
Service Discovery Protocol (SDP) is a means for applications 
to discover which services are available and to determine the 
characteristics of those available services. The SDP is used by 
a Bluetooth client device to locate services that are available 
on or via devices in the client’s air space. The WiFi data 
consists of MAC address, SSID (service set identifier), 
channel, speed, vendor name, encryption, managed or ad hoc, 
signal strength, signal to noise ratio (SNR), latitude and 
longitude, capability information, and beacon interval.
A three dimensional plot of normalized SNR, encryption, 
and channel WiFi data is shown in Figure 1. The data depicts 
the access points that would be easy for malicious users to 
target; i.e., no encryption and a high SNR. Figure 2 shows a 
plot of normalized access point manufacturer, encryption, and 
SNR WiFi data. A malicious person might target devices of a 
given manufacturer by simply trying the default SSID and 
password to gain administrative access to the device. An 
invalid MAC address (no denoted manufacturer) for some 
host may be an indication that the host is sniffing network 
traffic.
Figure 1. SNR, Encryption, and Channel Data 
Figure 2. Manufacturer, Encryption, and SNR Data  
One approach to detecting regularities and correlations in 
WiFi/Bluetooth discovery data is to group the data into classes 
or clusters. All of the objects in one cluster are highly similar 
to one another, and dissimilar to objects in other clusters. The 
data is represented as input vectors, where each input vector is 
for some WiFi/Bluetooth access point/device. Each element in 
a vector represents a WiFi/Bluetooth characteristic. One 
model-based approach to clustering data is a self-organizing 
neural network (NN) known as a Kohonen map [12, 13, 14]. 
Possible uses of the Kohonen map are for exploratory data 
analysis and novelty detection. As the network learns to 
recognize clusters of data the user also begins to understand 
the data and can refine the network and label the classes. Then 
the network can be used to perform classification of new data. 
If new data does not fit into the existing model, then these 
new data objects are called outliers and this indicates novelty. 
Novel manufacturer types, indicated by the first 6 digits of the 
MAC address, may represent spoofed MAC addresses. 
Wireless landscape data was collected, while driving 
through a community, on observed wireless access points 
using both a high-gain directional antenna and a wireless 
PCMCIA card. WiFi data collection resulted in the discovery 
of over 800 access points and devices. The data shows that 
approximately 47% of detected access points have no 
authentication or encryption. In the wired world, this is 
analogous to finding Ethernet cables at various community 
locations that anyone can plug into and gain unrestricted 
access to the Internet with no authentication. Only 4% of the 
devices detected represented peer-to-peer connections. 
5Mobile devices are not highly secure. A number of devices 
are configured by default (Bluetooth and WiFi) to allow 
access to other computing resources with minimal security. 
Devices with Bluetooth technology fully enabled and ready to 
connect to others have easily been found in public places 
using a Bluetooth discovery tool such as BlueScanner. 
A wireless intrusion detection system (WIDS) may help 
mitigate the threats posed to wireless local area networks 
(WLAN) and mobile devices via any wireless technology. A 
WLAN may be subject to TCP/IP and denial of service 
attacks, MAC address spoofing, and a wide variety of 802.11 
specific threats [15].
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Relatively inexpensive and powerful mobile devices using 
high-speed mobile data networks via WiFi, Bluetooth, and 
cellular technologies are the future. These devices are used in 
remote sensing, input [16], and control applications [17]. 
Mobile devices are not highly secure and, like desktop 
computers, need to have defensive software installed for 
protection. The Dick Tracy watch popularized in 1940s 
comics may be viable in the not too distant future as high-
speed mobile networks become pervasive and mobile devices 
continue to increase in power and capability 
(http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=Dick+T
racy+watch&i=41250,00.asp).
Our future work involves further exploration of 
vulnerabilities in wireless technologies, developing additional 
mechanisms to both identify device vulnerabilities and to 
protect mobile devices from attack, and using mobile devices 
as remote sensors. Countermeasures may be developed for 
mobile device vulnerabilities when no commercial software 
exists. 
A long-term goal is to perform semi-automatic collection of 
mobile device vulnerability data from the Internet and 
populate the MDVD. Clustering and classification of 
vulnerability and wireless data will be used in combination 
with active interrogation of a mobile device, as the device 
enters some area space, to identify potential threats to 
enterprise systems. This data will be used to help spot 
vulnerable devices and as input to a WIDS. The WIDS will 
use this information to detect both common and unique threats 
to the wireless landscape using neural networking techniques. 
Efficient clustering and classification techniques will be 
explored to gain a deeper understanding of regularities and 
correlations in mobile devices. 
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